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Abstract—Mobile autonomous system (MAS) becomes perva-
sive especially in the vehicular and robotic networks. Multiple
heterogeneous MAS networks can be integrated together as a
multi-layer MAS network to offer holistic services. The network
connectivity of multi-layer MAS plays an important role in the
information exchange between agents within and across different
layers of the network. In this paper, we establish a games-
in-games framework to capture the uncoordinated nature of
decision makings under adversarial environment at different
layers. Specifically, each network operator controls the mobile
agents in his own subnetwork and designs a secure strategy
to maximize the global network connectivity by considering
the behavior of jamming attackers that aim to disconnect the
network. The solution concept of meta-equilibrium is proposed to
characterize the system-of-systems behavior of the autonomous
agents. For online implementation of the control, we design a
resilient algorithm that improves the network algebraic connec-
tivity iteratively. We show that the designed algorithm converges
to a meta-equilibrium asymptotically. Finally, we use case studies
of a two-layer MAS network to corroborate the security and agile
resilience of the network controlled by the proposed strategy.
Index Terms—Mobile autonomous system, Multi-layer net-
works, Games-in-Games, Connectivity, Cybersecurity
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative mobile autonomous system (MAS) has a wide
range of applications, such as rescue and monitoring the crowd
in mission critical scenarios [1], [2]. One of the challenges in
designing the MAS network is to maintain the connectivity
between agents/robots1, since a higher connectivity enables
faster information spreading and hence a high-level of situa-
tional awareness. Connectivity control of the mobile robotic
networks has been addressed in a number of previous works
including [3]–[5]. They have successfully tackled a single
network of cooperative robots. Recent advances in networked
systems have witnessed emerging applications involving multi-
layer networks or network-of-networks [6]–[8]. For example,
in the battlefield, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and un-
manned ground vehicles (UGVs) execute tasks together, and
the whole network can be seen as a two-layer interdependent
network. The connectivity of the two-layer network can play
a key role in the operations for a given collaborative mission.
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1The “agent” refers to the robot in our MAS network. We also use the
terms “MAS network” and “robotic network” interchangeably.
To enable the real-time decision making of each agent, the
integrated network needs to guarantee a level of connectivity.
Therefore, the current single network control paradigm is
not yet sufficient to address the challenges related to the
analysis and design of multi-layer MAS networks. The main
objective of this work is to develop a theoretic framework that
can capture the interactions between agents within a network
and across networks and enable the design of distributed
control algorithms that can maintain the connectivity in both
adversarial and non-adversarial environment.
In our problem, the operator of each layer MAS network
aims to maximize the algebraic connectivity [9] of the global
network. If the whole network is fully cooperative or governed
by a single network operator, then the designed network is a
team-optimal solution. However, in practice, different layers of
robotic networks are often operated by different entities, which
makes the coordination between separate entities difficult. This
uncoordinated control design naturally leads to a system-of-
systems (SoS) framework of the multi-layer MAS network.
For example, in the aforementioned two-layer UAV and UGV
mobile networks, though the objectives of two network oper-
ators are aligned, the UAVs are operated by one entity while
the UGVs is operated by another. The lack of the centralized
planning can result in insufficient coordination between two
networks and lead to disruptions in connectivity and security
vulnerabilities. To address this problem, we establish a Nash
game-theoretic model in which two players, i.e., network
operators, control robots at their layer, to maximize the global
connectivity independently. This model captures the lack of
coordination between players and their decentralized decision
making in optimizing the SoS performance.
Cybersecurity is another critical concern of MAS, since
robots are prone to adversarial attacks, e.g., the communication
links between robots can be jammed (e.g., [10], [11]) which
decreases the connectivity. Therefore, secure control of the
multi-layer MAS networks is critical to maintain the SoS
performance at a high level. To this end, we model the mobility
of robots by taking into account the imperfect communication
links under adversarial environment. Specifically, each net-
work operator anticipates the jamming attacks and controls
robots by anticipating that a set of critical links between
agents can be compromised. This secure control design can
be modeled by a Stackelberg game between each network
operator and the attacker.
In this work, we integrate the modeled Nash game be-
tween two network operators as well as the Stackelberg
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game between the network operator and the attacker which
further yields a games-in-games framework. This new type of
game provides a holistic modeling that integrates the network-
network interactions and the agent-adversary interactions to-
gether for the secure and decentralized control design of multi-
layer MAS networks. We propose a meta-equilibrium solution
for this games-in-games which includes the optimal strategy
of network operators and the strategic jamming attacks of
adversary. We further develop a resilient and decentralized
mechanism that guides the algorithmic design of MAS for
achieving a meta-equilibrium solution. A typical example is
that two network operators update their own network in a
round-robin fashion based on the current network to maximize
the network connectivity. This alternating-play mechanism
induces an iterative algorithm that can converge to a meta-
equilibrium asymptotically.
The games-in-games framework provides a theoretical foun-
dation for understanding the agile resilience of the system
to cyberattacks, which is a critical system property for the
MAS network to recover quickly especially for mission-critical
applications. When robots or communication links in the net-
work are compromised, the integrated MAS network under the
designed control strategy needs to respond to the unexpected
disruptions with agility to mitigate the loss of connectivity.
Hence, to investigate the resilience of the designed algorithm,
we first introduce another type of cyber threats called GPS
spoofing attacks. The resilience is measured by the enhanced
SoS performance through the design of post-attack control
strategies. Simulation results show that the multi-layer MAS
network is resilient to attacks using the proposed control
method. After the detection of spoofing attack by the network
operator, the MAS network shows agile resilience to the attack
and the system adapts and reconfigures itself to an efficient
meta-equilibrium that coincides with the one without attack.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) We establish a games-in-games framework that enables
uncoordinated and secure control of MAS in the multi-
layer networks under cyberattacks.
2) We propose a meta-equilibrium solution concept to
capture the interdependent decision makings of network
players in a holistic fashion, and characterize the strate-
gic behavior of the attacker explicitly.
3) We design a resilient and decentralized iterative algo-
rithm that aims to maximize the algebraic connectivity
of the global MAS network, and show its asymptotic
convergence to a meta-equilibrium.
4) We corroborate the security and resiliency of the de-
signed control algorithm for multi-layer MAS network
extensively by case studies.
A. Related Work
MAS has been applied to a number of emerging fields. One
of them is drone delivery [12] which has attracted significant
attention from industries. Another one is the unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) assisted sensing and communication networks
for disaster response and recovery [2], [13]. Since we focus
on controlling groups of MAS, our work is also related to the
classical control of multi-agent systems [14]–[17].
One critical factor needs to be considered for MAS network
is its connectivity. When MAS is adopted in mission critical
scenarios, such as battlefields and disaster-affected areas, a
higher network connectivity provides a higher level of situa-
tional awareness [18]. In this work, we adopt Fiedler value [9]
(or called algebraic connectivity) as a metric to measure the
network connectivity. Maximizing the algebraic connectivity
of networks has been investigated extensively in literature,
including single-layer static network [19], single-layer mobile
network [3], [14], [20]–[22], multi-layer static network [7],
[23]. We focus on optimizing a new category of multi-layer
MAS network connectivity in this work. Moreover, we design
the network strategically by considering prevalent cyberattack
models on the communication networks [10].
Connectivity control of mobile robotic network has been
often addressed either in a fully centralized way [3], [24] or
completely decentralized way [5], [22]. Our proposed model
stands in between these two frameworks, and thus results in
balanced features in terms of resiliency and optimality. Some
results of this paper have been presented in Chapter 3 of
[25]. This work extends it in multiple aspects, including more
analytical results with complete proofs, thorough framework
development, extensive discussions of the model and results,
and new case studies.
B. Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents some basics of graph theory. Section III formulates
the secure multi-layer MAS network formation problem. We
analyze the problem and present the meta-equilibrium solution
concept in Section IV. Section V reformulates the problem
and develops an iterative algorithm to compute the solution.
Section VI analyzes the strategy of attacker and another type
of cyberattacks. Section VII uses some case studies to illustrate
the results. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND INTERDEPENDENT NETWORKS
In this section, we present the basics of interdependent
networks and the algebraic connectivity metric.
A. Preliminaries
Let G(V,E) be an undirected graph composed by n nodes
and interconnected by m links. For a link l that connects nodes
i and j where the link weight equaling to wij , we define two
vectors al and bl, where al(i) = 1, al(j) = −1, bl(i) = wij ,
bl(j) = −wij , and all other entries 0. Then, the Laplacian
matrix L of network G can be expressed as
L =
m∑
l=1
alb
T
l , (1)
where “T ” denotes the matrix transpose operator. Intuitively,
the diagonal entry Lii in the Laplacian matrix is equal to the
weight of node i, i.e., Lii =
∑
j∈Ni wij , ∀i ∈ V , where Ni
denotes the set of nodes that connects with node i. In addition,
Lij = −wij , ∀i 6= j ∈ V, if nodes i and j are connected,
and otherwise is 0. Additionally, Laplacian matrix is positive
semidefinite, and L1 = 0, where 1 is an n-dimensional vector
with all one entries. Thus, by ordering the eigenvalues of L
in an increase way, we obtain
0 = λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ ... ≤ λn, (2)
where λ2(L) is called algebraic connectivity (or Fiedler value)
of G [9]. Algebraic connectivity is an indicator of how well
a graph is connected. Moreover, λ2(L) = 0, when G is
not connected. For a graph with Laplacian L, the algebraic
connectivity λ2(L) can be computed from the Courant-Fisher
theorem [26] as follows:
λ2(L) = min{zTLz|z ∈ 1⊥, ||z||2 = 1}, (3)
where || · ||2 denotes the standard L2 norm.
B. Interdependent Networks
For a two-layer interdependent network, we define two
networks G1(V1, E1) and G2(V2, E2), where network 1 and
network 2 are represented by Gi, for i = 1, 2, respectively.
Network i, i ∈ {1, 2}, is composed of ni = |Vi| nodes and
mi = |Ei| links, where |·| denotes the cardinality of a set. The
global network resulting from the connection of these two net-
works can be represented by G = (V1 ∪ V2, E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E12),
where E12 is a set of intra-links between G1 and G2. For
convenience, we denote the network consisting of the intra-
links between G1 and G2 as G12. The adjacency matrix
A of the global network G has the entry aij = wij if
nodes i and j are connected and aij = 0 otherwise. Let
A1 ∈ Rn1×n1 and A2 ∈ Rn2×n2 be the adjacency matrices
of G1 and G2, respectively, and n = n1 +n2. When E12 6= ∅,
the adjacency matrix A ∈ Rn×n takes the following form
A =
[
A1 B12
BT12 A2
]
, where B12 ∈ Rn1×n2 is a matrix
capturing the effect of intra-links between networks. Define
two diagonal matrices D1 ∈ Rn1×n1 and D2 ∈ Rn2×n2 as{
(D1)ii =
∑
j (B12)ij ,
(D2)ii =
∑
j (B
T
12)ij .
Based on L = D−A, we obtain
the Laplacian matrix L =
[
L1 +D1 −B12
−BT12 L2 +D2
]
, where L1
and L2 are the Laplacians corresponding to A1 and A2,
respectively.
Remark: The above formulated two-layer MAS network can
be easily extended to multi-layer scenarios.
III. SYSTEM FRAMEWORK AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we introduce the system framework which
includes the wireless communication model and the strategic
interdependent MAS network formation.
A. Wireless Communication Model
In the MAS, we consider a set V of robots in the network,
and their positions at time k are defined by the vector x(k) =(
x1(k); x2(k); ...;xn(k)
) ∈ R3n. Robots in the same network
can exchange data via wireless communications. Denote the
communication link between robots i and j as (i, j). Then,
the strength of the communication link (i, j) is similar to the
Fig. 1. Communication strength under function f(d) = δ(c1−d)/(c1−c2)
with δ = 0.1, c1 = 2 and c2 = 6.
Fig. 2. Multi-layer MAS network in an adversarial environment.
weight of the link in a network. Thus, we associate a weight
function w : R3 × R3 → R+ with every communication link
(i, j), such that
wij(k) = w
(
xi(k), xj(k)
)
= f
(‖ xij(k) ‖22) , (4)
for some differentiable f : R+ → R+, where xij(k) :=
xi(k)−xj(k), and ‖ xij(k) ‖2 is the distance between robots i
and j at time k. To capture the communication strength decay
with the distance, f is a monotonically decreasing function.
A typical choice of f is f(d) = δ(c1−d)/(c1−c2), where δ, c1
and c2 are positive constants. Note that different forms of f
capture various decay rates of communication strength with
distance [27]. Thus, the weight of the link between robots is
positive if their distance is within a threshold and degenerates
to zero otherwise. Fig. 1 shows an example of f with δ = 0.1,
c1 = 2 and c2 = 6.
B. Secure Interdependent MAS Network Formation
A two-layer MAS network model is shown in Fig. 2,
where networks G1 and G2 include n1 and n2 number of
robots, respectively. More generally, we label robots in G1 as
1, 2, ..., n1, and robots in G2 as n1+1, n1+2, ..., n1+n2, i.e.,
V1 := {1, 2, ..., n1} and V2 := {n1+1, n1+2, ..., n}. Note that
n = n1+n2. Robots in these two layers can also communicate,
and this kind of communication link is called intra-link while
the link inside of a network is known as inter-link. The agents
at two layers are interdependent, and thus the integrated MAS
network can be modeled as a system-of-systems.
1) Network Designer: We consider two players, player 1
(P1) and player 2 (P2), operating two interdependent MAS
networks. P1 controls robots in network G1, and P2 controls
robots in G2. Specifically, P1 and P2 update their own
network with a fixed frequency by controlling the positions
of robots. After each update, the communication link strength
between robots are modified due to the change of distance.
For simplicity, define −γ := {1, 2} \ γ, where γ ∈ {1, 2},
and x := (x1,x2), where x1 := (x1; ...;xn1) ∈ R3n1 and
x2 := (xn1+1; ...;xn) ∈ R3n2 . Specifically, x1 and x2 are
decision variables denoting the position of robots in G1 and
G2, respectively. In addition, the action spaces of P1 and P2
are denoted by X1 and X2, respectively, which include all
the possible network configurations. The set of pure strategy
profiles X := X1 × X2 is the Cartesian product of the
individual pure strategy sets. For each update, Pγ’s strategy
xγ is based on the current configuration of network G−γ . The
goal of both players is to optimize the SoS performance, i.e.,
maximize the algebraic connectivity of the global network G.
Hence, the utility function for both players is λ2
(
LG(x)
)
:
X → R+, where LG(x) is the Laplacian matrix of network
G when mobile robots have position x.
In the adversarial network formation game, one of the
constraints is the minimum distance between robots in each
layer. Without this constraint, all robots at the same layer
will converge to one point finally which is not a reasonable
solution. Thus, we assign a minimum distance ρ1 and ρ2 for
robots in G1 and G2, respectively.
2) Cyber Attacker: In addition to the network players P1
and P2, our framework also includes a malicious jamming
attacker as shown in Fig. 2. The attacker is able to disrupt
communication links via injecting a large amount of spam
into the channel which leads to the link breakdown eventually
because of overload of the link. The attacker’s objective is to
minimize the algebraic connectivity of the network through
compromising links. Generally, the behavior of attacker is
unknown to the network operators. Therefore, it is difficult
for the network designers to make optimal strategies that can
achieve the best performances of the network. However, by
knowing that attackers are strategic and are more prone to
disrupt the critical communication links in the network, the
network operators can design a secure MAS network resistant
to cyberattacks. Specifically, network designers first anticipate
that the attacker can compromise a number ψ ∈ N+ of links,
and then design the MAS network by taking into account
the worst-case attack that leads to the most decrease of the
network algebraic connectivity. The resistant property of the
network is reflected by the fact that the designers prepare for
the potential attacks and respond to them with best strategies.
Here, ψ quantifies the security level of the designed network.
Denote A by the action space of the attacker which is the set
including all the possible single communication link removal
in the network. For convenience, we denote LeG(x) by the
Laplacian matrix of the network after removing a set of links
e ⊆ A, i.e., the network after attack is G(V,E1∪E2∪E12\e),
and the cardinality of e is |e| = ψ quantifying the ability
of attacker, where ψ ∈ N+ is a positive integer. Denote the
feasible set of e by E . Then, the cost function of the attacker
Nash game
Jamming attacker
Network G2Network G1
Stackelberg game Stackelberg game
Fig. 3. Games-in-Games framework which includes two network operators
and one attacker. Both network operators prepare for the cyberattack which
form a Stackelberg game with the attacker. In addition, two network operators
are uncoordinated and aim to maximize the global network connectivity which
create a Nash game.
can be captured by Λ(x1,x2, e) , λ2
(
LeG(x)
)
, for Λ : X1 ×
X2 × E → R+.
C. Games-in-Games Formulation
During the MAS network formation, the interactions be-
tween two networks G1 and G2 can be modeled as a Nash
game where both players aim to increase the global net-
work connectivity. In addition, each network operator plays
a Stackelberg game with the malicious jamming attacker.
Therefore, the multi-layer MAS network formation in the
adversarial environment can be characterized by a games-in-
games framework which is shown in Fig. 3. In the following,
we specifically formulate the attacker’s and network operators’
problems, respectively.
1) Stackelberg Game: In the Stackelberg game, network
designer is the leader, and the jamming attacker is the follower.
The objective of the attacker is to minimize the algebraic
connectivity of network G. We can summarize the strategic
behavior of the attacker into the following problem:
QkA : min
e⊆A,|e|=ψ
λ2
(
LeG(x(k + 1))
)
. (5)
On the leader side, network operator Pγ maximizes the
algebraic connectivity of the network, where γ ∈ {1, 2},
and his decision can be obtained via solving the optimization
problem:
Qkγ : max
xγ(k+cγ)
min
e⊆A,|e|=ψ
λ2
(
LeG(x(k + cγ))
)
s.t. ||xij(k + cγ)||2 ≥ ργ , ∀(i, j) ∈ Eγ ,
||xij(k + cγ)||2 ≥ ρ12, ∀i ∈ Vγ , ∀j ∈ V−γ ,
||xi(k + cγ)− xi(k)||2 ≤ dγ , ∀i ∈ Vγ ,
xj(k + cγ) = xj(k), ∀j ∈ V−γ ,
(6)
where cγ ∈ N+ is a positive integer indicating the update
frequency; ργ ∈ R+ is the safety distance between robots;
ρ12 ∈ R+ is the minimum distance between robots in different
layers; and dγ ∈ R+ is the maximum distance that robots in
network Gγ can move at each update. The constraint xj(k +
cγ) = xj(k), j ∈ V−γ captures the uncoordinated nature that
each network operator can only control the robots at his layer.
Furthermore, this constraint preserves security consideration
between agents in V−γ and also ensures consistent connectivity
improvement when player γ updates his network.
The Stackelberg game between the attacker and network
operator γ can be represented by Ξγ := {Nγ ,Xγ ,A, λ2} for
γ ∈ {1, 2}, where Nγ := {Pγ , Attacker} is the set of players,
Xγ and A are action spaces and λ2 is the objective function.
2) Nash Game: The interaction between two robotic net-
works in an adversarial environment can be characterized
as a Nash game in which both players aim to increase the
global network connectivity. We denote this strategic game by
ΞI := {P1, P2,X1,X2, λ2}.
Note that the MAS network formation game is played
repeatedly over time, and its structure is the same only with
different initial conditions in terms of the robots’ position. This
two-person interdependent MAS network formation game can
be naturally generalized into an N -person game where each
player controls a subset of robots in the multi-layer networks.
Remark: In the focused model, the attacker is the follower
and is not assumed to act in a proactive way. The attacker is a
player in the game whose strategic action is anticipated by the
network designers. Under some other models, e.g., multi-stage
sequential games where the attacker takes an action followed
by the defender, the attacker plays a non-passive role and can
manipulate the outcome by selecting an equilibrium. This case
is a further extension of the model introduced in this paper.
The methodologies that have introduced in this work can be
extended and applied to this new context.
It is possible that the attacker could manipulate and exploit
operator’s anticipation for his own benefit. To capture this
scenario, we need to propose an alternative model that extends
the current framework. In this work, we assume that the
network operators choose an action by anticipating credible
adversarial behaviors. The attacker can manipulate the above
defense mechanism by anticipating defender’s strategy. One
way to achieve this goal for the attacker is to make decisions
over a time horizon instead of a single time step. When the
time horizon contains two steps, then the attacker address a
three-stage game (attacker-defender-attacker) that he takes the
lead first. A dynamic game of similar three-stage structure has
been investigated in [18], [28]. Interested readers can refer to
that for detailed description of the framework.
IV. PROBLEM ANALYSIS AND SOLUTION CONCEPTS
In this section, we first reformulated problems in Section
III, and then present the solution concept of the MAS network
formation game.
A. Problem Reformulation
Note that each network designer updates the robotic network
iteratively based on the current configuration. It is essential to
obtain the relationship between the updated position and the
current one due to the natural dynamics of robots. To achieve
this goal, we define Zij(k) := ||xij(k)||22 for notational
convenience. Analogous to applying Euler’s first order method
to continuous dynamics, we can obtain Zij(k +m) based on
the current positions xi(k) and xj(k) as follows:
Zij(k +m) + Zij(k)
= 2{xi(k +m)− xj(k +m)}T {xi(k)− xj(k)}.
(7)
Readers interested in the details of obtaining (7) can refer to
Appendix A. Similarly, by using the function f in (4), the
updated weight wij(k +m) can be expressed as:
wij(k +m) = wij(k) +
∂f
∂||xij ||22
∣∣∣∣
k
(Zij(k +m)−Zij(k)).
(8)
Therefore, we can obtain the Laplacian matrix LG
(
x(k+m)
)
by using (8) for the global network.
Each network designer needs to solve a max min problem
which are not straightforward to deal with. We first present
the following result.
Theorem 1. For a network containing n nodes, the optimiza-
tion problem
max
x
min
e⊆A,|e|=ψ
λ2(L
e
G(x)) (9)
is equivalent to
max
x,β
β
s.t. LeG(x)  β(In −
1
n
11T ), ∀e ⊆ A, |e| = ψ,
(10)
where β is a scalar, and In is an n-dimensional identity matrix.
Note that the optimal x and the corresponding objective values
in these two problems are equal.
Proof. Let vi be the eigenvector associated with eigenvalue λi
of the Laplacian matrix LeG(x), for ∀i ∈ V . Since LeG(x) is
real and symmetric, its eigenvectors can be chosen such that
they are real and orthonormal, i.e., vTi vj = 0,∀i 6= j ∈ V and
vTi vi = 1. Specially, we define v1 :=
1√
n
, which is actually
the eigenvector corresponding to λ1 = 0. For convenience, we
denote V := [v1, v2, ..., vn], and Υ = diag(λ1, λ2, ..., λn),
where diag is the diagonal operator. Thus, Υ is a diagonal
matrix with ith diagonal entry λi(LeG(x)). Furthermore, based
on the orthonormal basis, we obtain VVT =
∑n
i=1 viv
T
i =
In. The definition of eigenvalue yields LeG(x)V = VΥ.
Multiplying by VT on the right leads to eigen-decomposition:
LeG(x) = L
e
G(x)VV
T = VΥVT =
n∑
i=1
λi(L
e
G(x))viv
T
i .
(11)
Since λ1 = 0, equation (11) can be simplified as
LeG(x) =
n∑
i=2
λi(L
e
G(x))viv
T
i . (12)
Next, we add λ2(LeG(x))v1v
T
1 to both sides of
(12) and obtain LeG(x) + λ2(L
e
G(x))v1v
T
1 =∑n
i=2 λi(L
e
G(x))viv
T
i +λ2(L
e
G(x))v1v
T
1 . Note that similar to
(11),
∑n
i=2(λi(L
e
G(x))−λ2(LeG(x)))vivTi +0·v1vT1 = V(Υ−
diag(0, λ2, λ2, ..., λ2))V
T = LeG(x)− diag(0, λ2, λ2, ..., λ2),
where we use λ2 for clarity in the diagonal entries. The
eigenvalues of matrix LeG(x) − diag(0, λ2, λ2, ..., λ2) can
be obtained straightforwardly as {0, 0, λ3 − λ2, ..., λn − λ2}
and thus LeG(x) − diag(0, λ2, λ2, ..., λ2)  0 based on
property (2), meaning that it is positive semidefinite. In sum,∑n
i=2(λi(L
e
G(x)) − λ2(LeG(x)))vivTi  0 which can be
rewritten as LeG(x) 
∑n
i=2 λ2(L
e
G(x))viv
T
i . Then,
LeG(x) + λ2(L
e
G(x))v1v
T
1 
n∑
i=2
λ2(L
e
G(x))viv
T
i
+ λ2(L
e
G(x))v1v
T
1 = λ2(L
e
G(x))
n∑
i=1
viv
T
i .
(13)
Thus, we obtain LeG(x)  λ2(LeG(x))(In − v1vT1 ), yielding
LeG(x)  λ2(LeG(x))(In −
1
n
11T ). (14)
The above analysis is for any given attacker’s strategy e ⊆ A.
Next, we show that our modified algebraic connectivity max-
imization problem is equivalent to maxx,β β in (10), i.e.,
maxx,β β = λ2(L
e∗
G (x
∗)), where x∗ and e∗ are the optimal
decisions. For convenience, we denote β∗ = maxx,β β.
The proof includes two parts. First, we show that β∗ ≥
λ2(L
e∗
G (x
∗)). We aim to maximize the algebraic connectivity
λ2(L
e
G(x)), and (x
∗, e∗) is a feasible solution pair. Therefore,
based on (14), β∗ ≥ λ2(Le∗G (x∗)) should hold, since β is
a free variable to optimize in the problem (10) while its
counterpart in (14), λ2(LeG(x)), is dependent on x and e.
Second, we show that β∗ ≤ λ2(Le∗G (x∗)). Since β∗, e∗,x∗ are
feasible, then, the constraints in (10) should be satisfied, i.e.,
LeG(x
∗)  β∗(In − 1n11T ), ∀e ⊆ A, |e| = ψ, which gives
Le
∗
G (x
∗)  β∗(In− 1n11T ). Let µ be any unit vector that sat-
isfies µT v1 = 0. Then, we obtain µTLe
∗
G (x
∗)µ ≥ µTβ∗(In −
1
n11
T )µ → µTLe∗G (x∗)µ ≥ β∗µT Inµ − β∗µT v1vT1 µ →
µTLe
∗
G (x
∗)µ ≥ β∗µT Inµ = β∗. Since vector µ is not fixed,
and based on (3), we have λ2(Le
∗
G (x
∗)) ≥ β∗. Therefore,
maxx,β β = λ2(L
e∗
G (x
∗)), and (9) is equivalent to (10). 
Next, we define a new Stackelberg game Ξ˜γ :=
{Nγ ,Xγ ,A, αγ , λ2}, for γ ∈ {1, 2}, where Nγ , Xγ and A
are the same as those defined in game Ξγ ; αγ and λ2 are
the objective functions of the network designer and attacker,
respectively. Based on (7), (8) and Theorem 1, the network
designer γ’s problem is formulated as follows, for γ ∈ {1, 2}:
Q˜kγ : max
xγ(k+cγ),αγ(k+cγ)
αγ(k + cγ)
s.t. LeG(k + cγ)  αγ(k + cγ)(In −
1
n
11T ),
∀e ⊆ A, |e| = ψ,
2{xi(k + cγ)− xj(k + cγ)}T {xi(k)− xj(k)}
= Zij(k + cγ) + Zij(k), ∀i, j ∈ Vγ ,
||xij(k + cγ)||2 ≥ ργ , ∀(i, j) ∈ Eγ ,
||xij(k + cγ)||2 ≥ ρ12, ∀i ∈ Vγ , ∀j ∈ V−γ ,
||xi(k + cγ)− xi(k)||2 ≤ dγ , ∀i ∈ Vγ ,
xj(k + cγ) = xj(k), ∀j ∈ V−γ .
Note that Laplacian matrices LeG(k + cγ), for γ = 1, 2, are
constructed based on (8).
The above analysis leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The Stackelberg game Ξ˜γ is strategically equiv-
alent to the game Ξγ defined in Section III-C, for γ ∈ {1, 2}.
The interactions between two network operators can be cap-
tured by a strategic equivalent Nash game denoted by Ξ˜I ,
where Ξ˜I includes αγ , γ = 1, 2..
B. Equilibrium Solution Concepts
1) Stackelberg Equilibrium of the Adversarial Game Ξ˜γ:
In the Stackelberg game, the attacker’s strategy is the best
response to the action that network designer chooses. Recall
that Λ(x1,x2, e) = λ2
(
LeG(x)
)
, and the formal definition of
best response is as follows.
Definition 1 (Best Response). For a given strategy pair
(x1,x2), where x1 ∈ X1 and x2 ∈ X2, the best response of
the attacker is defined by BR(x1,x2) := {e′ : Λ(x1,x2, e′) ≤
Λ(x1,x2, e),∀e, e′ ⊆ A, |e′| = |e| = ψ}.
Thus, we give the definition of the Stackelberg equilibrium
of game Ξ˜γ , for γ ∈ {1, 2}.
Definition 2 (Stackelberg Equilibrium). For a given x−γ ∈
X−γ , the profile (x∗γ , e
∗) constitutes a Stackelberg equilibrium
of the adversarial game Ξ˜γ , for γ ∈ {1, 2}, if the following
conditions are satisfied:
1) Attacker’s strategy e∗ ⊆ A, where |e∗| = ψ, is a best
response to (x∗γ ,x−γ), i.e., e
∗ ∈ BR(x∗γ ,x−γ).
2) Network designer γ’s strategy x∗γ ∈ Xγ satisfies
min
e∈BR(x∗γ ,x−γ)
Λ(x∗γ ,x−γ , e) =
max
xγ∈Xγ
min
e∈BR(xγ ,x−γ)
Λ(xγ ,x−γ , e) , Λγ∗,
where Λγ∗ is the Stackelberg utility of the designer γ.
2) Nash Equilibrium of the MAS Network Formation Game
Ξ˜I : After P1 takes his action at step k, G1 and G12 are
reconfigured, where G12 is the network between G1 and
G2. We denote network G1 and G12 at stage k as G1,k
and G12,k, respectively. For simplicity, we further define
G˜12,k := G1,k ∪ G12,k, which is a shorthand notation for
the merged network. Then, network Gk can be expressed as
Gk = G˜12,k ∪G2,k. Similarly, after P2 updates network G2 at
step k, the whole network Gk becomes Gk = G˜21,k ∪G1,k,
where G˜21,k := G2,k ∪ G12,k. Then, the formal definition
of Nash equilibrium (NE) which depends on the position of
robots is as follows.
Definition 3 (Nash Equilibrium). The Nash equilibrium so-
lution to game Ξ˜I is a strategy profile x∗, where x∗ =
(x∗1,x
∗
2) ∈ X, that satisfies
λ2
(
LGk(x
∗
1,x
∗
2)
) ≥ λ2(LGk(x1,x∗2)),
λ2
(
LGk(x
∗
1,x
∗
2)
) ≥ λ2(LGk(x∗1,x2)),
for ∀x1 ∈ X1 and ∀x2 ∈ X2, where k denotes the time step.
Note that LGk in Definition 3 captures the network charac-
teristic under all possible attacks instead of a particular one.
At the NE point, no player can individually increase the global
network connectivity by reconfiguring their MAS network.
3) Meta-Equilibrium of the Games-in-Games: To design a
secure multi-layer MAS, each network operator should take
into account the attacker’s behavior and the other network
operator’s strategy. The Nash game and the Stackelberg game
are inherently coupled, as the adversarial consideration nat-
urally affects the operators’ decisions in the Nash game.
Furthermore, the NE (Definition 3) alone cannot fully capture
all the required elements in the games-in-games framework,
as the adversarial strategy is characterized by the Stackelberg
equilibrium. Hence, a holistic solution concept is necessary
for our composed game which is presented as follows.
Definition 4 (Meta-Equilibrium). The meta-equilibrium of the
multi-layer MAS network formation game is captured by the
profile (x∗1,x
∗
2, e
∗) which satisfies the following conditions:
1) (x∗γ , e
∗) constitutes a Stackelberg equilibrium of game
Ξ˜γ , for γ = 1, 2.
2) x∗ = (x∗1,x
∗
2) is an NE of game Ξ˜I .
Note that the meta-equilibrium is a solution concept for the
composed game (games-in-games), which captures the incoor-
dination between two network operators (Nash game) and the
security consideration of each network operator (Stackelberg
game) simultaneously.
V. SDP-BASED APPROACH AND ITERATIVE ALGORITHM
In this section, we reformulate the network designer’s
problem as a semidefinite programming (SDP) and design
an algorithm to compute the meta-equilibrium of the MAS
network formation game.
A. SDP Reformulation
Notice that in Q˜kγ , the minimum distance constraints
||xij(k + cγ)||2 ≥ ργ , ∀(i, j) ∈ Eγ , are nonconvex. To
address this issue, we regard Zij(k + cγ) as a new decision
variable. Based on the definition Zij(t) := ||xij(t)||22, we have
||xij(k+ cγ)||22 = Zij(k+ cγ). Note that the Laplacian matrix
LeG(k + cγ) depends linearly on Zij(k + cγ), i, j ∈ V , based
on (8). Then, we solve problems Q˜kγ with respect to unknowns
Zij(k + cγ) and x(k + cγ) jointly. In this way, Q˜kγ becomes
a convex problem. However, due to the coupling between
the robots position and the distance vectors, solving Q˜kγ via
merely adding new variables yields inconsistency between the
obtained solutions x(k + cγ) and Zij(k + cγ), ∀i, j ∈ V . To
address this issue, we first present the following definition.
Definition 5 (Euclidean Distance Matrix). Given the positions
of a set of n points denoted by {x1, ..., xn}, the Euclidean
distance matrix representing the points spacing is defined as
D := [dij ]i,j=1,...,n, where dij = ||xi − xj ||22.
A critical property of the Euclidean distance matrix is
summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 ( [29]). A matrix D = [dij ]i,j=1,...,n is an
Euclidean distance matrix if and only if
−CDC  0, and dii = 0, i = 1, ..., n, (15)
where C := In − 1n11T .
Note that (15) is a necessary and sufficient condition that
ensures D an Euclidean distance matrix. In addition, the
inequality and equality in (15) are both convex. Therefore,
Theorem 2 provides an approach to avoid the inconsistency
between the robots position and distance vectors when they
are treated as independent variables. In specific, denote Z =
[Zij ]i,j∈V , C = In − 1n11T , and we can further reformulate
problems Q˜kγ , γ ∈ {1, 2}, as
Qkγ : max
xγ(k+cγ),Z(k+cγ),αγ(k+cγ)
αγ(k + cγ)
s.t. LeG(k + cγ)  αγ(k + cγ)C, ∀e ⊆ A, |e| = ψ,
2{xi(k + cγ)− xj(k + cγ)}T {xi(k)− xj(k)}
= Zij(k + cγ) + Zij(k), ∀i, j ∈ Vγ ,
Zij(k + cγ) ≥ ρ2γ , ∀(i, j) ∈ Eγ ,
Zij(k + cγ) ≥ ρ212, ∀i ∈ Vγ , ∀j ∈ V−γ ,
−CZ(k + cγ)C  0, Zii(k + cγ) = 0, i ∈ V,
||xi(k + cγ)− xi(k)||2 ≤ dγ , ∀i ∈ Vγ ,
xj(k + cγ) = xj(k), ∀j ∈ V−γ .
(16)
Remark: In Qkγ , the relationship ||xij(k+ cγ)||22 = Zij(k+
cγ) is ensured by the constraint 2{xi(k + cγ) − xj(k +
cγ)}T {xi(k) − xj(k)} = Zij(k + cγ) + Zij(k). In this con-
straint, Zij(k) is known which can be calculated based on the
current position x(k), i.e., Zij(k) = ||xi(k) − xj(k)||22. Fur-
thermore, constraints −CZ(k+cγ)C  0 and Zii(k+cγ) = 0
guarantee that the elements in Z(k + cγ) are equal to the
distances between corresponding nodes.
Note that Pγ controls robots in Gγ and reconfigures the
network by solving Qkγ to obtain the new positions of robots
for γ ∈ {1, 2}. Furthermore, Qkγ becomes convex and admits
an SDP formulation which can be solved efficiently.
B. Iterative Algorithm
We have obtained the SDP formulations Q
k
γ , γ = 1, 2,
and next we aim to find the solution that results in a meta-
equilibrium MAS configuration. In the MAS formation game,
P1 controls robots in G1 and reconfigures the network by
solving the optimization problem Q
k
1 to obtain a new position
of each robot. P2 controls robots in network G2 in a similar
way by solving Q
k
2 . Note that the players’ action at the current
step can be seen as a best-response to the network at the
previous step by taking the worst-case attack into account.
Since both players maximize the global network connectivity
at every update step, then one approach to find the meta-
equilibrium solution is to address Q
k
1 and Q
k
2 iteratively by
two players until the yielding MAS possesses the same secure
topology, i.e., P1 and P2 cannot increase the network con-
nectivity further through reallocating their robots. For clarity,
Algorithm 1 shows the updating details. A typical example of
the algorithm is alternating update in which P1 and P2 have
the same update frequency but not update at the same time
and reconfigure the MAS network sequentially.
Algorithm 1 Secure and resilient MAS network formation
1: Initialize mobile robots’ position xi(0), ∀i ∈ V , x(1) =
2x(1− c1) = 2x(1− c2), c1, c2, κ = 10−6.
2: for k = 1, 2, 3, ... do
3: if k mod c1 = 0 and ‖x(k)−x(k− c1)‖∞ > κ then
4: P1 obtains new strategy x1(k+c1) via solving Qk1
5: else x1(k) = x1(k − 1)
6: end if
7: if k mod c2 = 0 and ‖x(k)−x(k− c2)‖∞ > κ then
8: P2 obtains new strategy x2(k+c2) via solving Qk2
9: else x2(k) = x2(k − 1)
10: end if
11: Break if ‖x(k)−x(k−c1)‖∞ ≤ κ and ‖x(k)−x(k−
c2)‖∞ ≤ κ and k > max(c1, c2)
12: k ← k + 1
13: end for
14: return x(k)
C. Structural Results
Regarding the feasibility of the problems Qkγ for γ = 1, 2,
we have the following remark.
Remark: For a given multi-layer MAS network where the
distance between robots satisfies the predefined minimum dis-
tance constraint, problems Qk1 and Q
k
2 are always feasible. The
feasibility can be indeed achieved by the players’ strategies
that they do not update the position of robots at step k.
When Qk1 and Q
k
2 are feasible at each update step, another
critical property is the convergence of the proposed iterative
algorithm. The result is summarized in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. The proposed Algorithm 1 of the adversarial
network formation game converges to a meta-equilibrium
asymptotically.
Proof. Note that at each stage of play, the game captured by
Q¯k1 and Q¯k2 can be characterized as a constrained potential
game due to the identical objective of two players [30]. The
designed algorithm is based on the best response dynamics
which yields a non-decreasing network connectivity sequence.
Furthermore, for a network with n nodes, its algebraic connec-
tivity is upper bounded by a value depending on f(dγ) [31].
Thus, based on the monotone convergence theorem [32], the
algorithm converges to a meta-equilibrium asymptotically. 
We next show that designers’ adversary-anticipation is ben-
eficial to the network performance and the multi-layer MAS
network is resistant to strategic attacks.
Lemma 1. Under the established games-in-games model
in Section III-C, we obtain λ2
(
LekGk(x1(k),x2(k))
) ≥
λ2
(
Le˜kGk(x˜1(k), x˜2(k))
)
, where (x1(k),x2(k)) is a strategy
pair of network operators resulting from (16) with an appro-
priate time index; (x˜1(k), x˜2(k)) is a corresponding strategy
pair without adversary-anticipation (ignoring the first con-
straint in (16)); and ek and e˜k are the attacker’s admissible
strategies at step k satisfying ek ∈ BR(x1(k),x2(k)) and
e˜k ∈ BR(x˜1(k), x˜2(k)). The inequality also holds at the
meta-equilibrium (x∗, e∗).
Proof. We prove the result consecutively in two parts, i.e.,
before and after the network reaching meta-equilibrium. For
the first part, the network configuration at every time step k
incorporates the consideration of |e| = ψ link attacks and the
physical constraints, i.e., the maximum distance that robot can
move at one time step and the minimum distances between
robots. Assume that designer γ, γ ∈ {1, 2}, updates the con-
figuration and the position of robots becomes xγ(k) at time k.
Then, the updated position xγ(k) of player γ is a best response
to x−γ(k) with the consideration of constraints (ones in (16)
with different time index), and (x1(k),x2(k)) is an optimal
strategy maximizing the connectivity under any ψ link attacks.
Therefore, the global MAS network is resistant to this type of
strategic attacks during updates. We next proceed to show the
second part. Through the designed algorithm, the network has
been shown to converge to a meta-equilibrium. The network
connectivity at the meta-equilibrium (x∗1,x
∗
2) under attack
e∗ ∈ BR(x∗1,x∗2) is λ2
(
Le
∗
G (x
∗)
)
. Since two designers have
the same objective, at their equilibrium strategies (x∗1,x
∗
2),
both designers have a consistent anticipation on the set of
link removals under the worst-case attack, i.e., e∗. By the
definition of Stackelberg game, we know that x∗γ is the optimal
strategy under any ψ link removals for designer γ, and this
fact holds simultaneously for both designers at equilibrium.
Therefore, λ2
(
Le
∗
G (x
∗)
)
is the maximum network connectivity
that designers can achieve under strategic attacks, showing the
resistance of the network to adversary at equilibrium. 
We next investigate the uniqueness of the meta-equilibrium
of the game, and the result is shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. The meta-equilibrium of the game is not unique,
i.e., different equilibrium profiles (x∗1,x
∗
2, e
∗) are possible.
Proof. To show the nonuniqueness of the meta-equilibrium,
one possible way is to find a different position pair (x˜∗1, x˜
∗
2)
but the network configuration is the same with a one under
the meta-equilibrium, say (x∗1,x
∗
2). This can be achieved
by the simultaneous offset or rotation in x∗1 and x
∗
2. For
example, under the meta-equilibrium (x∗1,x
∗
2, e
∗), the profile
(x∗1 + ζ,x
∗
2 + ζ, e
∗) is also a meta-equilibrium, where ζ ∈ R3,
and this shows the nonuniqueness of the equilibrium. 
The network configuration at meta-equilibrium can also be
different at which the network exhibits various levels of net-
work connectivity. This phenomenon is further demonstrated
through case studies in Section VII.
Remark: Due to nonuniqueness of meta-equilibrium, it is
important for the network designers to achieve an equilibrium
state with a higher connectivity. We need to deal with a
mechanism design or an equilibrium selection problem. One
general method to address this type of problem is through a
top-down approach. Specifically, we first need to know the
complete set of equilibria and then decentralize the solution
for two network designers to drive the system to a desired
equilibrium state. Hence, in addition to two network operators,
we need to include an additional central planner who has
perfect information of the system and guides the decentralized
network configuration updates of two designers to achieve a
particular equilibrium solution.
Another result is on the effectiveness of our proposed strat-
egy comparing with simpler ones without attack anticipation
for the network designers. In the proposed model considering
adversary, if the attack does not occur, then the network
connectivity achieved at the meta-equilibrium is no better than
the one obtained by the model without considering adver-
saries. However, when the attack is successfully launched,
the network performance under the established framework
is no worse than the one without considering adversaries.
Characterizing the conditions under which these two classes
of strategies coincide is not trivial and it is also related to the
system parameters of multi-layer MAS.
In Section VII, we use a case study to show the advantage
of our proposed framework over the traditional optimal design
when the adversary is ignored. In the case study, the equilib-
rium network is still connected under the strategic attack while
the optimal network counterpart is disconnected. Therefore,
preparation for and reacting to attacks can yield significant
benefits for the MAS network under adversarial environment.
VI. ADVERSARIAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we first analyze the security of MAS network
by deriving a closed form solution of the jamming attacker,
and then present another type of cyberattacks for further
resiliency quantification of the proposed iterative algorithm.
Finally, we discuss the benefits of anticipating and reacting to
the adversary for the network designers during control design.
A. Adversarial Analysis
Denote the network as G˜(i, j) = (V,E \ (i, j)) after
removing a link (i, j) ∈ E from network G, then, we have
L˜ = L − ∆L and ∆L = ∆D − ∆A, where ∆D and ∆A
are the decreased degree and adjacency matrices, respectively.
By using equation (1), we obtain ∆D and ∆A as follows:
∆D = eie˜
T
i,j + ej e˜
T
j,i,∆A = eie˜
T
j,i + ej e˜
T
i,j , where ei and
e˜i,j are n-dimensional zero vectors except the i-th element
equaling to 1 and wij , respectively, and similar for ej and
e˜j,i. Denote the Laplacian matrix of G˜(i, j) as L˜(i, j), and by
using ∆D and ∆A, we have
L˜(i, j) = L− (ei − ej)(e˜i,j − e˜j,i)T . (17)
When link (i, j) is attacked, the resulting Laplacian is
given by (17). Denote the Fiedler vector of L as u, and thus
uTLu = λ2(L) based on the definition. By using Courant-
Fisher Theorem in (3), we obtain the following:
λ2
(
L˜(i, j)
) ≤ uT L˜(i, j)u
= uT
(
L− (ei − ej)(e˜i,j − e˜j,i)T )u
= uTLu− (ui − uj)(wijui − wjiuj)
= λ2(L)− wij(ui − uj)2.
(18)
Therefore, by removing the link (i, j)∗, where
(i, j)∗ ∈ arg max
(i,j)∈E
wij(ui − uj)2, (19)
the upper bound of λ2
(
L˜(i, j)
)
is the smallest. The strategy
in (19) can be seen as a greedy heuristic for the attacker
to compromise the network G. Specifically, the attacker can
apply the above procedure iteratively to find a set of critical
links to accommodate the attacker’s ability. To this end, the
jamming attacker’s strategy is to compromise those links with
top ψ largest value of wij(ui − uj)2, i, j ∈ V . Therefore, the
network operators designs secure strategies by anticipating that
these ψ critical links could be compromised by the attacker.
B. Another Type of Cyberattack
In order to assess the resilience of designed iterative algo-
rithm in Section V-B, we introduce another type of adversarial
attacks to the MAS network called global positioning system
(GPS) spoofing attack.
GPS Spoofing Attack: A GPS spoofing attack aims to
deceive a GPS receiver in terms of the object’s position,
velocity and time by generating counterfeit GPS signals [33].
In [34], the authors have demonstrated that UAVs can be
controlled by the attackers and go to a wrong position through
the GPS spoofing attack. We consider the scenario that the
compromised robot is spoofed which can be realized by adding
a disruptive position signal to the robot’s real control com-
mand. Therefore, through the GPS spoofing attack, the mobile
robot is controlled by the adversary, but it still maintains
communications with other robots in the network. In addition,
we assume that the attack cannot last forever but for a period
of ga in the discrete time measure, since the resource of an
attacker is limited, and the abnormal/unexpected behavior of
the other unattacked robots resulting from the spoofing attack
can be detected by the network operator.
Specifically, if robot i, i ∈ V , is compromised by the
spoofing attack at time step k1, and the attack lasts for ga
time steps, then this scenario can be captured by adding the
following constraint to Qkγ : xi(k + 1) = xi(k) + (k), k =
k1, ..., k1+ga−1, where (k) is the disruptive signal added by
the attacker. The attacked robot is usually randomly chosen.
To evaluate the impact of attack, we choose the robot that has
the maximum degree denoted by imax and satisfies
imax ∈ arg max
i∈V
∑
j∈Ni
wij , (20)
where Ni is the set of nodes connected to robot i.
The GPS spoofing attack decreases the network connectiv-
ity. The resilience of the designed algorithm can be quantified
by the increased network performance by the network opera-
tors’ responses to the cyberattacks.
C. Benefits of Anticipating and Reacting to Adversary
We comment on the benefits of the established approach that
enhances the network resistance to attacks. First, the Stack-
elberg modeling incorporates the security consideration of
network designers. This anticipative behavior of the defender
ensures the resistance of network under successful worst-case
attacks. The security consideration is critical and also prac-
tical for the network operators in devising proactive defense
strategies, and its significance is demonstrated through case
studies in Section VII. Second, besides the inherent security
modeling, reacting to the adversary also helps in improving
the system performance if the attack is unanticipated. Then,
the operator can respond to the unanticipated attack in the next
round which enhances network resilience. Thus, the proposed
method guides the secure and resilient decentralized control
design of MAS networks.
VII. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we use case studies to quantify the security
and resiliency of the designed algorithm, and identify the
interdependency in the multi-layer MAS networks. We adopt
YALMIP [35] to solve the corresponding SDP problems.
Specifically, we consider a two-layer MAS network in which
G1 contains 2 nodes and G2 contains 6 nodes. To illustrate
that the designed framework can be applied to cases where the
robots at one layer can further be operated in a decentralized
way, we assume that the robots in G2 are divided into 2 equal-
size groups connected by a secure link between nodes 3 and
4. The investigated scenario is applicable when the agents in
MAS are sparsely distributed in geometric clusters.
The communication strength between agents follows the one
in Fig. 1. Further, two layers of MAS are operated in two
planes where the third dimension of their position is fixed
satisfying the minimum distance ρ12. The initial positions of
robots in G1 (upper layer) are (1,3,1.2), (2,3,1.2), and robots
in G2 (lower layer) are (0,0,0), (0,1.5,0), (1,0,0), (2,0,0), (3,-
1.5,0), (3,0,0). The safety distance between robots in G1 and
G2 is ρ1 = ρ2 = 1, and the maximum distance that robots at
each layer can move at each update step is d1 = d2 = 0.2.
The update frequency of network operator P1 is two times
faster than network operator P2, i.e., 2c1 = c2. In addition,
both network designers prepare for the worst-case single link
removal of jamming attack, i.e., |e| = ψ = 1, during the MAS
network formation.
A. Secure Design of MAS Networks
First, we illustrate the secure design of two-layer MAS
network under the jamming attack using Algorithm 1. Fig.
4 shows the results. The final positions of agents in G1 are
(1.88,-0.13,1.2), (1.88,0.87,1.2), and those in G2 are (0.94,-
0.85,0), (0.94,0.65,0), (1.60,-0.10,0), (2.26,0.65, 0), (1.55,-
0.29,0), (2.92,1.40,0). The connectivity of the integrated MAS
network is iteratively improved, and converges to a steady
value 1.4 after approximate 40 steps. During the updates,
each network operator anticipates of the strategic jamming
attack that compromises the most critical communication link.
Hence, the network shown in Fig. 4(b) is a meta-equilibrium
configuration. This example shows the effectiveness of the pro-
posed method in designing secure multi-layer MAS network.
To show the nonuniqueness of the equilibrium solutions, we
modify the initial positions of agents where the robots in G1
(upper layer) start with (3,1,1.2) and (3,2,1.2). The results
are shown in Fig. 5. We can see that the final positions of
agents in G1 are (1.06,0.59,1.2), (2.06,0.59,1.2), and those in
G2 are (0.05,0.58,0), (1.55,1.45,0), (1.05,0.58,0), (2.05,0.58,
0), (1.55,-0.29,0), (3.05,0.58,0). Further, the final network
configuration as well as network connectivity are different
(a)
(b) (c)
Fig. 4. (a) shows the evolutionary configuration of secure MAS network at
each step. (b) depicts the final network configuration. (c) shows the network
connectivity under attack with ψ = 1.
with the ones shown in Fig. 4 which corroborate the meta-
equilibrium of the proposed game is not unique.
Another critical question is to compare the quality of the
solution at meta-equilibrium with the one obtained without
considering attacks. To better illustrate the results, we se-
lect another set of parameters for communication channels:
δ = 0.1, c1 = 1, and c2 = 1.2, where agents have a lower
range of communication than the one in Fig. 4. In addition,
the number of agents in the upper layer G1 is reduced to 1
and the number of attacks is equal to ψ = 2. The adversary’s
action set A includes the links between two layers, i.e., inter-
links. Other settings are the same as those in previous case
studies. The results of network configurations with and without
considering attacks are shown in Fig. 6. In Fig. 6(a), since no
adversary is present in this scenario, the network connectivity
remains around 0.48. To demonstrate the difference of the
optimal solution without considering attack and the equilib-
rium solution, we introduce two attacks by removing two
most critical inter-links using the strategy in Section VI-A to
the optimal network (removing links (3,7) and (4,7)) at step
50, and the result is shown in Fig. 6(b). Comparing with the
secure MAS configuration using the proposed control with
connectivity 0.17 shown in Fig. 6(d), the originally optimal
network is completely disconnected after the attack which
makes the isolated agent 7 in an unanticipated condition. This
result shows the advantage of our proposed framework over
the traditional optimal design, since our approach integrates
the security aspects in the MAS control design.
B. Resilience of the Network to Cyberattacks
Second, we investigate the resilience of the designed MAS
network to cyberattacks presented in Section VI-B. The metric
(a)
(b) (c)
Fig. 5. (a), (b), and (c) show the results of the ones in Fig. 4. The initial
conditions of agents are modified and the final equilibrium network is different
with the one in Fig. 4 which shows the nonuniqueness of the equilibrium.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 6. (a), (b), and (c) show the results when the network designers do not
anticipate attacks. (d) is the equilibrium network when designers considers two
link attacks. The final network configurations in (c) and (d) are different. After
introducing the worst-case attacks to the optimal network (compromising the
inter-links (3,7) and (4,7)), the optimal network in (c) is disconnected and
the connectivity becomes 0. However, the meta-equilibrium network in (d) is
still connected after 2 inter-links attacks with a connectivity of 0.17 which
demonstrates the enhanced security of MAS networks.
used for quantifying the resilience is the recovery ability of
network connectivity after the adversarial attack.
For the GPS spoofing attack, we assume that it lasts for
5 time steps from step 9 to 14 before the detection of
abnormal movement of MAS by the network operator. Note
that the attack duration depends on the detection ability of
the network designer. After the identification of attack, the
(a) (b)
Fig. 7. (a) shows the evolutionary configuration of secure MAS network at
each step. The GPS spoofing attack is introduced at time step 9, and it lasts for
5 steps. The attack duration depends on the detection ability of the network
designer. (b) shows the corresponding network connectivity.
(a) (b)
Fig. 8. (a) shows the evolutionary configuration of secure MAS network at
each step. (b) shows the corresponding network connectivity. The spoofing
attack launches at step 35 and it lasts for 6 steps. The network recovers and
reaches a meta-equilibrium quickly after the removal of attack.
network designer can reboot the compromised agent for it
returning to the normal state. Moreover, the horizontal axis in
attacker’s disruptive command (k), k = 9, ..., 14, is drawn
uniformly from [0, 0.2]. Fig. 7 shows the obtained results
where agent 7 is compromised. Specifically, the network
connectivity encounters a sudden drop at step 9, from 0.58
to 0.37, as shown in Fig. 7(b) due to the spoofing attack. At
step 12 which is still in the attacking window, the connectivity,
however, has an increase which is a result from the updates
of agents at the lower layer G2. When the spoofing attack
is removed, the network recovers quickly after step 14 which
shows agile resilience of the proposed control algorithm. Note
that the final MAS network configuration is the same as the
one in Section VII-A.
We next investigate a scenario in which the spoofing at-
tack is introduced after the network reaching an equilibrium.
Specifically, the attack launches at step 35 and it lasts for 6
steps. The results are shown in Fig. 8. Similar to the previous
case, the network can response to the attack in a fast fashion
and tries to recover the network connectivity with its best effort
during the attacking window. After the detection and removal
of the attack, the network performance is improved and the
equilibrium network configuration is achieved which is the
same as the previous one before attack. Thus, the designed
two-layer MAS network using Algorithm 1 is resilient to
spoofing cyberattacks.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the secure control of
multi-layer MAS networks under the adversarial environment
by establishing a games-in-games framework. The newly
proposed meta-equilibrium solution concept has successfully
captured the secure and uncoordinated design of each layer
of MAS network through integrative Stackelberg and Nash
games. The developed iterative algorithm has been shown
effective in maximizing the network algebraic connectivity
under adversaries, yielding a meta-equilibrium network con-
figuration. Case studies have shown that the designed multi-
layer MAS network is of agile resilience to various kinds of
cyberattacks. As for future work, we can consider the network
operators having different estimations of severity of attacks,
and design the multi-layer MAS network with heterogeneous
security requirements. Another research direction is to design
mechanisms and decentralized algorithms to drive the multi-
layer MAS to a desired meta-equilibrium if multiple equilibria
exist. We can also investigate other games-in-games frame-
works where the attacker’s behavior is more sophisticated, e.g.,
the attacker makes decisions over a time horizon.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF EQUATION (7)
The dynamics of each robot i is originally described by
continuous-time models. Denote Zij(t) = ||xij(t)||22 and then
differentiate ||xij(t)||22 with respect to time t, and we obtain
2{x˙i(t)− x˙j(t)}T {xi(t)− xj(t)} = Z˙ij(t). (21)
By using Euler’s first order method, i.e., x(t)→ x(k), x˙(t)→
x(k+m)−x(k)
mτ , where m ∈ N+, and mτ is the time interval be-
tween two updates, we have 2{x˙i(t)−x˙j(t)}T {xi(t)−xj(t)}·
mτ = 2{xi(k+m)−xj(k+m)}T {xi(k)−xj(k)}−2||xi(k)−
xj(k)||22 = 2{xi(k + m) − xj(k + m)}T {xi(k) − xj(k)} −
2Zij(k), and Z˙ij(t) ·mτ = Zij(k + m) − Zij(k). Thus, we
can rewrite (21) as Zij(k+m) +Zij(k) = ||xij(k+m)||22 +
||xij(k)||22 = 2{xi(k +m)− xj(k +m)}T {xi(k)− xj(k)}.
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